University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2

Article 18

1972

Abrogation of Governmental ImmunityProspective, Quasi-Prospective, or Retrospective
Application

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Other Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Abrogation of Governmental Immunity- Prospective, Quasi-Prospective, or Retrospective Application, 6 U. Rich. L. Rev. 397 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol6/iss2/18

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Richmond Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Abrogation of Governmental Immnunity-PRSPECTivE, QUAsi-PRosPEcTIVE, OR RETROSPECrIVE APPLICATIO-Profitt v. State; Flournoy v. School

District Number One and Evans v. Board of County Commissioners
There is probably no tenet in our law that has been more universally
berated by courts and legal writers alike than the doctrine of governmental
and sovereign immunity.1 In response to this criticism, recent cases have
indicated the existence of a trend to abrogate the doctrine either in whole
or in part.2 Because the merits of the abrogation of governmental and
1See, e.g., Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ky. 1964); Bernardine v.
New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945); Smeltz v. Copeland, 440 Pa. 224,
226, 269 A.2d 466, 468 (1970) (dissenting opinion); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE LJ. 1 (1926); Borchard, Governmental Liability in
Tort, 34 YAM LJ. 1 (1924); Casner & Fuller, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation,
54 HAuv. L. Rav. 437 (1941); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN.
L. REv. 751 (1956); Eichner, A Century of Tort Immunities in Virginia, 4 U. Ricm.
L. Rav. 238 (1970); Green, Freedom of Litigation: Municipal Liability for Torts, 38

Imi. L. REv. 355 (1944); Greenhill & Murto, Governmental lImmunity, 49 TEx. L.
REV. 462, 472 (1971); Lloyd, Le Roi Est Mort-Vive le Roi, 24 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 38
(1949); Price & Smith, Municipal Tort Liability: A Continuing Enigma, 6 U. FLA.
L. REV. 330 (1953); Van Aistyne, Governmental Tort Liability: judicial Lawmaking
in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF ru LAW OF ToRTS S 131 (4dth ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PRossR].
For a comprehensive review of the literature in this field, see Repko, American
Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 214 (1942).
2
See Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963) (held
that the state can be liable for its tortious acts); Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429
S.W.2d 45 (1968) (abrogated immunity for municipal corporations); Muskopf v.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961)' (held
that governmental immunity from tort liability should be rejected as "mistaken and
unjust"); Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (held municipal
corporations liable in tort); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970) (allowed
recovery against the state); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d
11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) (held school district
liable in tort); Perkins v. State, 259 Ind. 549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969) (held the state
liable in tort); Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969) (held that the
immunity of the state for proprietary functions is abolished); Haney v. Lexington,
386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964) (abolished tort immunities for municipalities); Myers
v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965) (abrogated tort
immunity for a county); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962) (abrogated tort immunity for all governmental subdivisions);
-Brown v. Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968) (abrogated immunity for
all governmental subdivisions); Walsh v. Clark County School Dist, 82 Nev. 414,
419 P.2d 774 (1966)

(held that a school district did not enjoy immunity with re-

spect to an accident occurring several months before the effective date of a statute
waiving immunity from tort liability of state and its subdivisions); Willis v. Depart[ 397 ]
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sovereign immunity have been thoroughly discussed in the past,3 only the
various methods of application will be discussed herein.
The Supreme Court of Colorado in the recent companion cases of Profitt
v. State,4 Flournoy v. School DistrictNumber One,5 and Evans v. Board of
County Conmzissioners,6 abrogated completely the doctrine of sovereign
and governmental immunity in that state. The plaintiffs in each of those
cases were suing either a governmental agency or the state and were therefore confronted with governmental or sovereign immunity as an impediment
to recovery.7 The court held that, except for the cases at bar, the abrogation would be prospectively applied and would not become effective until
June 30, 1972.8

As a general rule, the effect of departing from precedent in overruling a
prior decision of a court of record is retrospective as to both the case at
bar and all other causes of action arising within the applicable statute of
limitations, and is prospective as to all future causes.9 However, a court may,
ment of Conservation & Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970) (held
state liable in tort); Becker v. Beaudoin, - R.I. -, 261 A.2d 896 (1970) (abrogated
the immunity of municipal and quasi-municipal corporations); Holytz v. Milwaukee,
17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (held municipality liable in tort).
Furthermore, it should be noted that some states and the federal government have
abrogated their immunities by legislation. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
5 2674 (1970); ALAs. STAT. tit. 9, ch. 65, § 09.65-070 (1962); N.Y. Ct. of Claims Act,
§ 8 (McKinney 1963); Vermont Laws 1961, Pub. Act No. 265, tit. 12, § 5.601-02.
See also Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1241, 429 S.W.2d 45, 48 (1968); W. PRosSER,
supra note 1.
A discussion of the applicable rules in those jurisdictions retaining sovereign and
governmental immunity is beyond the scope of this article. However, if more information is desired in this area, see 57 Am. JuR. 2d Municipal, School, and State Tort
Liability § 59-64 (1971); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1198 (1958); W. PROSSER, supra note 1.
3 See note 1 supra.
4 482 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1971).
5 482 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1971).
6 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971).
7 In the first of these cases, Profitt, the plaintiff brought an action to recover for
the alleged wrongful death of his son, who was stabbed while an inmate in the state reformatory. The plaintiff in Flournoy brought suit against a school district to collect damages for the alleged wrongful death of his son also, who was killed while under school
supervision. In Evans, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured as a result of carelessness on the part of the defendants in permitting concrete steps at the county
courthouse to deteriorate and thereby to constitute a dangerous hazard.
8 The court, in presenting its opinions on March 22, 1971, delayed the effect of its
decision for over fifteen months, because "Nto give the rule of this opinion immediate
effect would constitute a disservice to government entities which will not be able
to include in their budgets premiums for liability insurance coverage until a future
time." Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs., 482 P.2d 968, 972 (Colo. 1971).
9 See, e.g., Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst OiR & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932);
O'Malley v. Sims, 51 Ariz. 155, 75 P.2d 50 (1938); Los Angeles County v. Faus, 48
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by, expressly delineating the effect of its decision, declare its holding to be
prospective and affect only future cases, thereby excluding the case in
which the decision was made. 10 If the court decides to include the present
case in its decision, it may also choose to apply the quasi-prospective
method," which excludes prior causes of action, but includes the present
case.
, Each of these three methods of limiting a particular decision has disad-.
vantages and inequities inherent in its application. 12 Where a decision is
declared to operate only prospectively, 8 all statements to the effect that the
precedent is overruled are mere dicta, since the result reached would have
been the same had the prior decision been upheld.14 The actual holding is
accompanied by a prophecy of what the court will hold in the future. 1
Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J.
Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (1960).
10See, e.g., England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Great
N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Aronson v. Congregational
Temple De Hirsch, 123 So. 2d 408 (Fla. App. 1960); Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960);
Donahue v. Russell, 264 Mich. 217, 249 N.W. 830 (1933); Oklahoma County v.
Queene City Lodge, 195 Okla. 131, 156 P.2d 340 (1945); Freeman, The Protection
Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 CoLUM.
L. REv. 230 (1918); Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37
HARv. L. REv. 409 (1924); Note, Prospectivity and Retroactivity of Supremze Court
ConstitutionalInterpretations,5 U. RicH. L. REv. 129, n.4 (1970).
11 See Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 373-74, 107 N.W.2d 131, 133-34
(1961). See also Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Shioutakon
v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Durham v. United States, 214
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d 371
(1937); Douchey Co. v. Farney, 105 Misc. 470, 173 N.Y.S. 530 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
Various legal writers have also recommended the use of the quasi-prospective method
of overruling prior precedents. See, e.g., Wigmore, Editorial Preface to 9 MoDErN
LEaAL PanLosoPmr SEms at xxxvii-xxxviii (1917); Address by Chief Justice Cardozo,
N.Y. State Bar Association, Jan. 22, 1932, in 55 REPORT OF N.Y.S.B.A. 263, 294-96
(1932); Levy, Realistic Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. Rav.
1 (1960).
12 "Because we change prior settled law, it is inevitable that some will be adversely
affected hereby, no matter which basis we select." Myers v. Genessee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 4, 133 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1965). See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239,
429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961);
Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HAv. L. REv. 437 (1947); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 262 (1933).
13 See Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W2d 795 (1962).
14See Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 US. 358, 365 (1932); Von
Moschzisker, supra note 10. But see Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARv. L. REv. 437,439-40 (1947).
15 See note 14 supra.
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Furthermore, a prospective decision curbs the incentive to appeal the upholding of precedent, because the appellant cannot benefit from a reversal
thereof if the decision does not apply to his case. 16 However, a prospective
application does carry with it the advantage of allowing the affected govern17
mental agencies to obtain liability insurance before their immunity ends.
A quasi-prospective abrogation, on the other hand, not only protects the
governmental agencies in their probable reliance on the immunity, but also
recognizes the efforts of the present plaintiff in instituting the action to
abrogate the immunity doctrine. 18 A further advantage is that the decision,
16See, e.g., Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 968 (1960); Von Moschzisker, supra note 10; Note, The Effect of Overruled
and Overruling Decisions on Intervening Transactions, 47 HAxv. L. REv. 1403 (1934).
But see Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Levy, supra note 11;
Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling PriorDecisions, 60 HARe. L. REv. 437, 439-40 (1947).
17
In announcing a prospective abrogation of governmental immunity, the court in
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) stated:
It may appear unfair to deprive the present claimant of his day in court.
However, . . . it would work an even greater injustice to deny the defendant
and other units of government a defense on which they have had a right to
rely. . . . [Ilt is more equitable if they are permitted to plan in advance by
securing liability insurance or by creating funds necessary for self-insurance.
In addition, provision must be made for routinely and promptly investigating
personal injury and other tort claims at the time of their occurrence in order
that defendants may marshall and preserve whatever evidence is available for
the proper conduct of their defense.
Id. at 287, 118 N.W.2d at 804.
18 Only in Parish v. Pits, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 968 (1960); Becker v. Beaudoin, 261 A.2d 896 (R.I. 1970), did the court declare the abrogation of the immunity to be effective to the case at bar and all future
causes of action. In the remaining jurisdictions applying the quasi-prospective method,
the courts have declared that the decision would apply to the case at bar, but
would not be effective for other causes of action until a prescribed period of time
had elapsed, thereby allowing the affected governmental agencies or subdivisions
an even greater opportunity to protect themselves or the legislature time to act.
In Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970), the court stated that its
decision would affect the case at bar and:
[AUl future causes of action arising on or after 60 days subsequent to the
adjournment of the First Regular Session of the Forty-First Idaho State Legislature unless legislation is enacted at that session with respect to the abolition
of the sovereign immunity of the state. Id. at 950.
The court in Willis v. Department of Conservation, 55 N.J. 534, 537, 264 A.2d
34, 38 (1970), stated that "except for the immediate case, the courts will not accept
any tort claim araising before January 1, 1971." In Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841,
849, 457 P.2d 21, 29 (1969), it was held that "[Eixcept for the instant case, the
effective date of the abolition of the rule of government immunity . . . shall be
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because it does affect the case at bar, will itself represent a new precedent,
rather than mere dictum.' 9 However, serious inequities can arise from a
quasi-prospective application. A typical case in point is Molitor v. Kaneland
Conmzunity Unit DistrictNo. 302,20 which arose from a school bus accident
wherein eighteen children were injured. By abrogating the doctrine of
governmental immunity quasi-prospectively, the court allowed recovery
by one child, but precluded recovery by the other seventeen children who
were injured in the same accident. 2' Thus a quasi-prospective application
creates inequities when other suits could be instigated or are pending at the
time of the decision, because these will be excluded from the present ruling.
The most equitable application for possible deserving plaintiffs is the
retrospective decision,22 but it is basically unfair to the governmental agencies
which have relied upon the immunity. While a retrospective application
allows all deserving plaintiffs to recover for causes of action not barred by
an applicable statute of limitations, it subjects the governmental agency to
liabilities most likely not covered by insurance. To remedy the unfairness
to the governmental agencies which have relied upon the immunity, the
Aug. 30,
the court
To
the
the

1969"' In Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962),
stated that:
enable the various public bodies to make financial arrangements to meet
new liability implicit in this holding, the effective date of the abolition of
rule of governmental immunity for torts shall be July 15, 1962.... However,
... this decision shall apply to the case at bar. Id. at 33, 115 N.W. 2d at 626.
19 See note 18 supra.
20 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
21 In 37 CHm.-KmEr L. Rnv. 44 (1960), one writer criticized the quasi-prospective
abrogation of the governmental immunity in Molitor by stating:
If a legislature were to enact a law providing that whenever eighteen children
are injured in the burning of a school bus one shall have a cause of action
to recover damages and seventeen shall not, cries of outrage would ring through
the land. It is doubtful that it would be possible to find a single court which
would hesitate, even for one moment, before declaring such an enactment unconstitutional and void. Yet the Supreme Court of Illinois asserts the right to
grant, as a matter of reward, that which the legislature could not. Id. at 51.
See also Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 111. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959) (dissenting opinion); cf. Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1
(1961).
22Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Har-grove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Perkins v. State, 251 N.E.2d 30
(Ind. 1969); Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Myers v. Genesee
County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965); Walsh v. Clark County
School Dist, 82 Nev. 414, 419 P.2d 774 (1966).
Although the California court in Muskopf v. Coring Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) also applied the abrogation retrospectively, the
legislative fixed a period during which the new rule would be held in abeyance.
CAL. STAT. ch. 1404 (West 1961). See also Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, l1
N.W.2d 1 (1961).
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court may insert the qualification that the new rule applies retrospectively.
if, and only if, the city or governmental agency was insured against such
liability when the claim arose, and then only to the extent of the maximum
applicable amount of its insurance coverage. 23 Even though this method'
would still exclude certain deserving plaintiffs whose cause of action is
barred by a statute of limitations, it provides more advantages and fewer
disadvantages than any of the other methods of application. 24
Although the Colorado court, in Profitt,Flournoy, and Evans, came to a
laudable conclusion in its complete abrogation of sovereign and governmental immunity, its application of the decision under the quasi-prospective.
theory narrowed the number of affected causes of action to the cases at
bar and to those cases arising over fifteen months after the date of the presentation of the opinions. The court attributed the delay of application to.
its desire to give an opportunity either for the legislature to restore
the immunities or for the governmental agencies and subdivisions to obtain
adequate insurance coverage. 25 Even though the court doubtless intended
to apply the abrogation in the least inequitable fashion, that desired result
would have been best acomplished under the retrospective theory with the
added qualification that the governmental agency or subdivision have had
insurance coverage. In that manner, a greater number of deserving plaintiffs
23See, e.g., Johnson v. Municipal Univ., 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969);
Brown v. Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968).
The existence of insurance has been treated in itself as a waiver of immunity to
the extent of the coverage in several states. See Hall County v. Loggins, 110 Ga.
App. 432, 138 S.E.2d 699 (1964); Garrison v. Community Consol. School Dist., 34
Ill. App. 2d 322, 181 N.E.2d 360 (1962); Flowers v. Board of Comm'rs, 240 Ind. 668,
168 NZE.2d 224 (1960) (under statute); Ginter v. Montgomery County, 327 S.W.2d
98 (Ky. 1959); Geislinger v. Watldns, 269 Minn. 116, 130 N.W.2d 62 (1964);
Longpre v. Joint School Dist., 151 Mont. 345, 443 P.2d 1 (1968); Vendrell v. School
Dist., 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961); Ballew v. Chattanooga, 205 Tenn. 289, 326
S.W.2d 466 (1959); Medlar v. Aetna Ins. Co., 127 Vt. 337, 248 A.2d 740 (1968);
Marshall v. Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 (1963).
24By applying the abrogation of immunity in such a manner, the possibility of
large losses by uninsured governmental units is minimized. Furthermore, the fact
that the qualification is applied only retrospectively would prevent future governmental refusal to obtain insurance from operating as a bar to possible recovery by
the plaintiff.
Even though this method can be criticized because it seems to reward those governmental units which were uninsured, it is the best method to allow more frequent
recovery by possible deserving plaintiffs, while causing less inequity to those who
have
relied on the previous immunity.
25
See note 8 supra. A by-product of the delay, which could be avoided by application of the retrospective theory with the added qualification that the governmental
entity have had insurance, is that those plaintiffs whose causes of action arise during
the interim will be barred from recovery, thus creating a further inequity for possible
deserving plaintiffs.

1972]

RECENT DECISIONS

403

might have benefited from the abrogation of the outmoded governmental
immunity, while still not subjecting the governmental agency or subdivision
to undue hardship.
I. L. G., III

